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The First Islamist Republic: Development and Disintegration of Islamism in the
Sudan (Review)
Abstract
In this careful and engagingly written analysis of Hasan al-Turabi's decade in power, Abdullahi A. Gallab
concludes that the experience of Sudan during the "first Islamist republic" (1989-99) serves as a warning
against "ideological entrapments" (p. 167) of all kinds, and leads to the "realization that Islamism, like all
other isms, can be and should be contested" (p. ix). Drawing upon extensive interviews with Sudanese
Islamists, as well as upon Arabic and English studies, Gallab summarizes the Islamist experiment in
dismal terms. He variously calls it a "reign of terror," a "trauma," a source of "despair," "an open-ended
system of oppression," the product of a wide "range of deceits," a vehicle for the "violent suppression of
other religious systems" and political voices, and a "charade" (pp. 4, 15, 78, 137). In Gallab's account,
Turabi emerges as a manipulator and a megalomaniac (albeit a suave one) who entertained the creation
of a "personality cult" (p. 112) around him.
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and most of all re-dreaming with/through our children new possibilities
based on privileged hindsight.
TIBEBE ESHETE, Michigan State University

NOTE

1. Maimire Mennasemay, “Towards a Critical Ethiopian Theory of Education,”
in Education, Politics and Social Change in Ethiopia, ed. Paulos Milkias and
Messay Kebede (Hollywood, CA: Tsehai Publishers, 2010).

The First Islamist Republic: Development and Disintegration
of Islamism in the Sudan, by Abdullahi A. Gallab
Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2008; pp. 194. $99.95 cloth.

In this careful and engagingly written analysis of Hasan al-Turabi’s
decade in power, Abdullahi A. Gallab concludes that the experience of
Sudan during the “ﬁrst Islamist republic” (1989–99) serves as a warning
against “ideological entrapments” (p. 167) of all kinds, and leads to the
“realization that Islamism, like all other isms, can be and should be
contested” (p. ix). Drawing upon extensive interviews with Sudanese
Islamists, as well as upon Arabic and English studies, Gallab summarizes
the Islamist experiment in dismal terms. He variously calls it a “reign
of terror,” a “trauma,” a source of “despair,” “an open-ended system of
oppression,” the product of a wide “range of deceits,” a vehicle for the
“violent suppression of other religious systems” and political voices, and
a “charade” (pp. 4, 15, 78, 137). In Gallab’s account, Turabi emerges as
a manipulator and a megalomaniac (albeit a suave one) who entertained
the creation of a “personality cult” (p. 112) around him.
The title of this book, The First Islamist Republic, signiﬁes three
things. It signiﬁes, ﬁrst, the decade of rule before General Umar Beshir
pushed Turabi out of power, thereby revealing the rifts that had been
deepening within the upper tiers of the regime and the Islamist movement. Second, the title reﬂects the contention that this Islamist regime
was the ﬁrst Sunni Islamist regime of its kind in the world. Unlike the
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Shi’i Islamism of postrevolutionary Iran, which privileged ayatollahs
and Muslim clerics, this Sudanese Sunni Islamism of the late twentieth century favored and mobilized Western-educated intellectuals who
regarded themselves as agents of Muslim modernity and who looked
down on clerics as obstacles to progress. Finally, the title underlines the
argument that this Islamist republic was something new in Sudanese
history: it tried to harness political ideology to a kind of totalizing state
control over culture and society that was unprecedented in its scope. The
most salient features of the “ﬁrst Islamist republic” may have been its
centralizing power, ruthless suppression of dissent, and ambition—but
not its religious credentials per se.
With regard to Islamic credentials, Gallab argues that the regime
failed to set a “moral standard” (p. 78) from the moment the dust settled
after the 1989 coup. (Typical of this lack of integrity, Gallab believes,
was the way Turabi dissimulated by denying any involvement in the
1989 coup for a decade, only claiming to have played a leading role in its
orchestration after his fall from power.) Where, then, was the Islam in this
government’s Islamism? Rather than promoting the kind of commitment
to political ethics, social justice, and civil liberties to which a Muslim
humanitarian project might aspire, the regime focused on consolidating
power, suppressing dissent, fomenting diversionary internal conﬂicts in
the name of jihad, and making money. Gallab suggests that the Islamists
capitalized on Islamic banking and developed corporate ties in ways that
enabled them to amass wealth, and later to assert and tighten their political grip. Meanwhile, the Islamist republic set about building its coercive
apparatus, most egregiously by institutionalizing torture chambers known
as ghost houses. Gallab writes, “If the concentration camps were the
‘most consequential institutions’ of totalitarianism, as [Hannah] Arendt
described them, the ghost houses—‘the dwelling of horrors’—would
represent the core of this Sudanese regime’s totalitarianism” (p. 113).
In every “ism” is an element of idealism, and the Sudanese Islamist
movement—like the Sudanese communist and early nationalist movements before it—was no exception to this rule. That surely explains
the deep sense of disappointment and bitterness that pervades this
book. Gallab identiﬁes himself as an outsider to the Sudanese Islamist
movement, but nevertheless conveys the disillusionment of the many
former Turabi supporters, or Sudanese Islamists in the diaspora, whom
he interviewed. Sudanese Islamists, at their most idealistic, may have
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believed that modern, institutionalized Islamic government would offer
a cure for Sudan’s political ailments—the accumulation of ailments
from the colonial and postcolonial periods. Turabi’s regime dashed
those hopes.
By 1999, the Sudanese Islamist movement, as Gallab presents it,
had two other notable features. First, it was a very elite movement, and
to the extent that it had ever enjoyed popular appeal, this support was
ever diminishing. Even the regime’s “Popular Defense Forces,” which
carried out the war against the SPLA, were unpopular: they were ﬁlled
with “thousands of unprepared high-school graduates [who] were forcefully conscripted and thrown into war zones in the south” (p. 124). Nor
was the religious vision of the movement, to the extent that it had one,
inspiring to Muslim outsiders. Gallab suggests, instead, that in the face
of state-sanctioned Islamism, Suﬁ and neo-Mahdist Muslim cultures
thrived, making the Islamists look like a fringe group in power. Second,
the Sudanese Islamist movement appears to have been a highly parochial
movement. In recounting the movement’s history, its leaders insisted on
both the autonomy and the autochthony of Sudanese Islamism. They
denied that the movement was an offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood of Hasan al-Banna, and suggested instead that it had
emerged in Sudan as a parallel development. Given this emphatically
Sudanese consciousness, it is unclear how much the Sudanese Islamist
movement and the ﬁrst Islamist republic can tell us about global Sunni
Islamism. Turabi may have liked to style himself as a global Islamist
guru (for example, by trying to establish Khartoum as a regular venue
for the “Popular Arab and Islamic Conference”), but the dynamics of the
movement remained deeply rooted in local conditions.
Turabi steadily insisted on what the Sudan’s Islamist state was not. It
was not, he claimed, secular, nationalistic, or absolutist. Perhaps Turabi’s
greatest failure, in Gallab’s view, is that he never clariﬁed what an Islamic
state in Sudan actually was or should be. Thus Gallab paints a portrait of
an Islamist republic in which Islam, itself, was elusive. Questions linger.
Is Islamism as a political ideology fully discredited as an approach to
governing Sudan’s republic? Can a better, more ethically rigorous state
Islamism take hold? If not, what ideological source of hope—what “ism”
—will inspire Sudanese Muslim intellectuals in the future?
HEATHER J. SHARKEY, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia

